Guarding the Historical Record from the Nazi-Era Art Litigation Tumbling Toward the Supreme Court by Kreder, Jennifer Anglim
 
 
 
 
(253) 
 
ESSAY 
 
GUARDING THE HISTORICAL RECORD FROM THE  
NAZI-ERA ART LITIGATION TUMBLING  
TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT  
JENNIFER ANGLIM KREDER†
When the modern wave of claims against museums to recover 
paintings “displaced” during the Nazi era began, I, as an academic, 
approached the claims cautiously because I assumed that our es-
teemed institutions would not have knowingly profited from the spoli-
ation of property belonging to millions of persecuted refugees.  I was 
wrong.  I have come to understand, based on objective, historically 
sound records, that a significant number of our museums during and 
in the aftermath of the Holocaust actively acquired art that they knew 
or should have recognized likely came from Jewish homes and busi-
nesses.  These museums acquired this exquisite art despite widespread 
knowledge of Nazi looting and governmental warnings about the in-
fection of the art market.
 
1  Now, museums are using American courts 
to shut down inquiries into such art’s history by blocking claims on 
technical grounds,2 contrary to their own ethics guidelines3 and U.S. 
executive policy.4
 
†
Jennifer Anglim Kreder is a Professor of Law at the Salmon P. Chase College of 
Law, Northern Kentucky University.  She has been involved in Holocaust-era and art 
litigation since 1999 and currently serves as Co-Chair of the American Society of Inter-
national Law Interest Group on Cultural Heritage and the Arts. 
 
1
See Raymond J. Dowd, Federal Courts and Stolen Art:  Our Duty to History, FED. 
LAW., July 2008, at 4, 4-6 (discussing a 1950 U.S. State Department bulletin on re-
ports of stolen art). 
2
See also Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics and Holo-
caust-Era Claims:  Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible Stewardship for the Public 
254 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 253 
PENNumbra 
The Supreme Court is poised to review multiple writs for certiora-
ri this year in Nazi-looted-art cases.5  It has requested the Solicitor 
General to weigh in on one pending petition concerning the Califor-
nia legislature’s ability to insure that its courts welcome survivors and 
heirs seeking to recover their art.6  More petitions have been filed,7 
and more are possible.  The museums that have fought claims in U.S. 
federal courts include, among others, the Museum of Modern Art 
(MoMA) the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, the Norton Simon Mu-
seum, the Detroit Institute of Arts, and the Toledo Museum of Art.8
Some nations have fought similar claims in our courts concerning 
art indisputably stolen from Jews, including Austria
  I 
focus on museums because museums are breaking their own ethics 
codes and causing the U.S. government to break its international 
commitments by invoking our courts to resolve Holocaust-era-art 
claims on technical grounds rather than on the merits.  Although 
some collectors, auction houses, and dealers have also acted unethi-
cally, it is not necessary to delve into claims implicating those entities 
to make my point. 
9, Spain,10
 
Trust?, 88 OR. L. REV. 37, 56-75 (2009) (describing museums filing declaratory judg-
ment actions to preempt heirs’ claims). 
 Hun-
3
See Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, 
AM. ASS’N OF MUSEUMS (Nov. 1999), http://aam-us.org/museumresources/ 
ethics/nazi_guidelines.cfm (directing museums to address claims of ownership “open-
ly, seriously, responsively, and with respect for the dignity of all parties involved”); Re-
port of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art During the Nazi/World War II Era, ASS’N 
OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (June 4, 1998), http://www.aamd.org/papers/ 
guideln.php (recommending that member museums resolve claims in an “equitable, 
appropriate, and mutually agreeable manner”). 
4
See infra Part II.  
5
See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Chart of Dismissed Federal Holocaust-Era Art 
Claims Since 2004 (Feb. 23, 2011) (unpublished chart) [hereinafter Chart], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636295 (noting recent federal appellate decisions and 
pending certioriari petitions in Nazi-looted-art cases). 
6
See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 131 S. Ct. 379, 
379 (2010). 
7 See Chart, supra note 5. 
8
Id. 
9
See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 686 (2004) (discussing Austria’s 
claim of sovereign immunity).  Since its Supreme Court loss in 2004, Austria has signif-
icantly improved its restitution record.  See Kreder, supra note 2, at 53-55 (discussing 
Austrian legislation transferring ownership of looted art to the Austrian Jewish com-
munity).  However, one is still left to wonder about the controversy surrounding the 
painting Dead City III, which was seized at MoMA along with the painting Portrait of Wal-
ly in 1998.  See William D. Cohan, Unraveling the Mystery of “Dead City,” ARTNEWS, Apr. 
2008, at 114 (describing the seizures and resulting litigation). 
2011] Nazi-Era Art Litigation 255 
gary,11 and Switzerland.12  Most of the claims are still in the courts, 
with petitions for certiorari pending in several of the cases.13  Ironical-
ly, on December 13, 2010, Poland, which has had a poor restitution 
record,14 was the beneficiary of a civil forfeiture action filed by the 
U.S. government to recover a painting that had been stolen from a 
Polish museum during World War II.15
I.  CORE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
  Perhaps these actions suggest 
a new hope for restitution in eastern Europe. 
It is commonly estimated that the Nazis stole twenty percent of all 
of the art in Europe.16  According to Ronald Lauder, former U.S. am-
bassador to Austria and former MoMA chairman, based on informa-
tion known in 1998, “more than 100,000 pieces of art, worth at least 
$10 billion in total, are still missing from the Nazi era.”17  “[B]ecause 
of these large numbers, every institution, art museum and private col-
lection has some of these missing works.”18  We know that the Nazis 
targeted Jews personally, but many do not know that the Nazis also 
specifically targeted their art and other assets.19
 
10
See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 05-3459) (alleging a Madrid museum’s failure to return a seized work). 
  These losses of family 
11
See, e.g., Complaint at 2, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, No. 10-01261 
(D.D.C. filed July 27, 2010) (alleging that a Budapest museum wrongfully possesses a 
collection of over forty works). 
12
See, e.g., Orkin v. Swiss Confederation, No. 09-10013, 2011 WL 167840, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011) (discussing the plaintiff’s allegation of wrongful possession of 
a painting by a Swiss art collector). 
13
See Chart, supra note 5. 
14
See Dariusz Stola, The Polish Debate on the Holocaust and the Restitution of Property 
(describing the difficulties associated with restitution in Poland), in ROBBERY AND RES-
TITUTION:  THE CONFLICT OVER JEWISH PROPERTY IN EUROPE 240, 248-51 (Martin Dean 
et al. eds., 2007). 
15
See Complaint at 5-8, United States v. One Julian Falat Painting Entitled “Off to 
the Hunt,” No. 10-09291 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 13, 2010) (alleging that a painting of-
fered for sale by a U.S. auction house was wrongfully removed from Poland).   
16
E.g., Judy Dempsey, Roadblocks Remain in Case of Paintings Lost to Nazis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/arts/29iht-loot.html (cit-
ing the Commission for Art Recovery for the twenty-percent figure). 
17
Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to Valuable 
Artwork, 23 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 631, 660 (2000) (quoting Lauder). 
18
Id. 
19
See generally GÖTZ ALY, HITLER’S BENEFICIARIES:  PLUNDER, RACIAL WAR, AND THE 
NAZI WELFARE STATE (Jefferson Chase trans., 2005) (discussing which parties profited 
from the Aryanization of Jewish-owned property); HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MU-
SEUM:  THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (2d ed. 
1997) (highlighting some of the targeted and seized assets); JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, 
ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH (1996) (same); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF 
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heirlooms, cultural artifacts, and valuable assets compound the tragic 
loss of life and are just one reason why restitution is so important. 
Those unschooled in the intricacies of the Nazi schemes to take 
Jewish property have difficulty today understanding why a painting 
sold pursuant to a signed contract actually was a theft or duress sale.  
The explanation requires a certain level of historical understanding.  
From the very first weeks of the regime in early 1933, law and practice 
in Nazi Germany were engineered to make involuntary transactions 
appear ordinary and legal.20  Hitler immediately imposed crippling 
boycotts on Jews, implementing the Nazi Party platform stating that to 
buy from or sell to a Jew was to be a traitor to the German people.21  
Artists Hitler hated were boycotted, exiled and shunned.22  Massive 
“Aryanization” occurred.23  Moreover, “sale” proceeds were paid into 
blocked accounts.24
It would be a gross distortion of historical reality for anyone to 
suggest that the financial despair of Jews in 1933—during widespread, 
sporadic boycotts and until the passage of the first of the Nuremberg 
laws in 1935—resulted from a series of isolated private setbacks 
brought about by generalized, severe financial conditions akin to the 
Great Depression.  But as is illustrated in Part IV below, that is exactly 
what museums have alleged in our courts. 
   
Additionally, starting in April 1938, Nazis forced Jews to inventory 
all of their property and sign off on “legal” expropriations.25
 
EUROPA:  THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR (1994) (same). 
  The U.S. 
Consul General in Vienna, writing immediately after the German an-
nexation of Austria in March 1938, documented the twisted irony of 
this practice:  “There is a curious respect for legalistic formalities.  The 
signature of the person despoiled is always obtained, even if the per-
son in question has to be sent to Dachau in order to break down his 
20
See MARTIN DEAN, ROBBING THE JEWS:  THE CONFISCATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY 
IN THE HOLOCAUST, 1933–1945, at 33-50 (1st ed. 2008) (describing the legal changes 
behind denaturalization of German Jews and confiscation of their property). 
21
See id. at 31-32 (describing these boycotts and their effects on people who did 
not obey them). 
22
See PETROPOULOS, supra note 19, at 53-55 (detailing the antimodernist stance of 
the Third Reich). 
23
See Avraham Barkai, Ariesierung (describing the “term used to denote the trans-
fer of Jewish-owned independent economic enterprises to ‘Aryan’ German ownership 
throughout the Third Reich and the countries it occupied”), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE HOLOCAUST 84-87 (Israel Gutman ed. 1990). 
24
See DEAN, supra note 20, at 4, 61. 
25
Id. at 88-89. 
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resistance.”26  Another potent example of the Nazi obsession with le-
gality is that they left receipts when expropriating property from 
apartments of Jewish families that had fled.27
When the remaining Jews within the Reich had little or no prop-
erty left, the focus turned to “cost-efficient” mass murder in the death 
camps of occupied Poland.
 
28  The “legalized” grand larceny became a 
means of financing the mass murder.29  Compliance with law is what 
comforted the Nazis and German people as they persecuted the Jews.  
As discussed below, the United States and its allies committed to re-
versing Aryanizations, forced sales, and duress sales, initially via resti-
tution of “readily identifiable” works directly to theft victims.30  Ability 
to follow through on the commitment fell short as attention unders-
tandably turned to the Marshall Plan and to preventing Soviet expan-
sion of its sphere of influence to the Atlantic.31  Thus, the job was left 
largely to the victims themselves—survivors and heirs of the dead—to 
finish the search on an ad hoc basis.32
II.  CAN AN ALMOST SEVENTY-YEAR-OLD  
CLAIM REALLY BE VIABLE? 
  The victims have largely lacked 
the tools until now, and they still lack access to key information. 
In light of the history documented above, the presumption that 
claims to Holocaust-era assets almost seventy years old cannot be via-
ble is contrary to (1) common law doctrine that one cannot get title 
 
26
See NICHOLAS, supra note 19, at 39.  
27
See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (relating that Nazis 
took a Marc Chagall painting left by the plaintiff in her Brussels apartment and left a 
receipt indicating their appropriation of the painting for “safekeeping”), modified, 279 
N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). 
28
DEAN, supra note 20, at 173-74. 
29
Cf. id. at 395. 
30
See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 
957-58 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION:  THE U.S. AND HOLOCAUST VIC-
TIMS’ ASSETS SR-142 (2000)). 
31
See Michael J. Kurtz, Resolving a Dilemma:  The Inheritance of Jewish Property, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 625, 626 (1998) (“Though the commitment to restore cultural prop-
erty was supposedly absolute and unconditional, the political failure of the Allied Con-
trol Council (‘ACC’) in Germany and the onset of the Cold War in Eastern Europe 
raised significant barriers to a successful cultural restitution effort.”). 
32
The von Saher panel completely failed to understand that civil litigation has re-
mained a key component of restitution since the War.  See von Saher, 592 F.3d at 962-63 
(evincing a preference for state-sponsored programs rather than restitution through 
litigation). 
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from a thief;33
U.S. diplomats began laying the groundwork for postwar restitu-
tion during the war.  In the landmark 
 (2) nearly universally applicable discovery rule principles, 
my focus in Part III; and (3) executive policy, my focus in this Part. 
London Declaration of January 
5, 1943, the United States and its allies warned against looting by “dec-
lar[ing] invalid any transfers of, or dealings with, property . . . whether 
such transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting or 
plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they 
purport to be voluntarily effected.”34  Second, the United States ap-
pointed Army officers known as the “Monuments Men” to protect cul-
tural property throughout Europe during the War and to secure sto-
len art for later restitution—officers whose efforts were tremendous 
and became legendary.35  In spite of these intentions and actions, the 
Army could not sustain those efforts.  Accordingly, President Truman 
“adopted a policy of ‘external restitution,’ under which the looted art 
was returned to the countries of origin—not to the individual owners.”36
The end of direct restitution did not mark a change in the execu-
tive’s support of restitution in any way.  Renowned State Department 
Fine Arts & Monuments Adviser Ardelia R. Hall issued this statement 
on August 27, 1951:  “For the first time in history, restitution may be 
expected to continue for as long as works of art known to have been 
plundered during a war continue to be rediscovered.”
 
37
Jack B. Tate
  In May 1952, 
as private litigants started to press claims in U.S. courts after the war, 
, the Acting Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of 
 
33
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 773, 818 n.138 (2001) (“The general rule in America is that a bona fide 
purchaser cannot acquire title from a thief.”).  Other doctrines may nonetheless prec-
lude the claimant’s recovery.  See, e.g., Alexandra Minkovich, Note, The Successful Use of 
Laches in World War-II Era Art Theft Disputes:  It’s Only a Matter of Time, 27 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 349, 361 (2004) (explaining that defendants can use statute of limitations or 
laches-based arguments to retain artworks). 
34
Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy-Controlled Territory, 8 
DEP’T ST. BULL. 21, 21-22 (1943) (quoted in Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 327 F.3d 
1246, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing the declaration as an indication disfavoring im-
munity for expropriating paintings), aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004)). 
35
See ROBERT M. EDSEL WITH BRET WITTER, THE MONUMENTS MEN:  ALLIED HE-
ROES, NAZI THIEVES, AND THE GREATEST TREASURE HUNT IN HISTORY 2 (2009) (describ-
ing the mission of the Monuments Men and introducing their story). 
36
Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 958 (citing REPORT OF THE AM. COMM’N FOR THE PROT. 
AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS 148 (1946), 
commonly known as the Roberts Commission Report).   
37
Ardelia R. Hall, The Recovery of Cultural Objects Dispersed During World War II, 25 
DEP’T ST. BULL. 337, 339 (1951). 
2011] Nazi-Era Art Litigation 259 
State, clarified executive policy concerning individuals seeking to in-
voke the power of U.S. courts to obtain restitution: 
1.  This Government has consistently opposed the forcible acts of dispos-
session of a discriminatory and confiscatory nature practiced by the 
Germans on the countries or people subject to their controls. . . . 
3.  The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the 
United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensa-
tion in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result of 
Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve American courts from any re-
straint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of 
the acts of Nazi officials.
38
The U.S. executive branch operated on a parallel track in Europe.  
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared the 
plunder of art a war crime
 
39 Al-
fred Rosenberg
 and convicted and sentenced to death 
, head of the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg” art-looting 
unit.40  A military regulation adopted in 1947 mandated that Germany 
and Austria repudiate all spurious “transactions” from the entire Nazi 
era.41  Much more recently, U.S. diplomats played a leading role in se-
curing multilateral public commitments by scores of countries to im-
plement effective and fair resolutions of Nazi-looted-art claims based 
on the merits and not on legal technicalities.42
 
38
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 
210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (quoting Jack B. Tate, Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re 
Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers, 20 DEP’T ST. BULL. 592, 
592-93 (1949)). 
  Finally, the executive 
branch seized thousands of stolen art objects in the wake of World 
39
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 
284, 286-88 (defining “plunder of public or private property” as a war crime). 
40
See Judgment of the Int’l Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals, Nuremberg, Sept. 30 & Oct. 1 1946, at 94-96 (1946) (finding Rosenberg 
guilty of war crimes for organizing the Einsatzstab group). 
41
See Restitution of Identifiable Property, 12 Fed. Reg. 7983 (Nov. 29, 1947) (es-
tablishing a presumption that “transactions” between 1933 and 1945 were confiscations 
requiring restitution). 
42
See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE:  LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, 
AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 196-203 (2003) (discussing the Wash-
ington Conference and its efforts to reach an agreement on returning confiscated 
works); Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference:  Terezin Declaration, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
( June 30, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm (urging 
simple resolution of property claims and recommending that participating states im-
plement programs to return property); Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 3, 1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm (encouraging efforts to locate heirs 
and reach just and fair resolutions of ownership issues).  
260 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 253 
PENNumbra 
War II,43 and more recently, it seized paintings in 1998 and December 
2010, including a painting titled Portrait of Wally.44
III.  JUDICIAL MISAPPLICATION OF TIME-BAR DOCTRINES  
IS DISTORTING THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
  From wartime dec-
larations to recent seizures, executive policy in the United States has 
been to examine the merits of each case and, wherever possible, re-
turn looted art to its rightful owner or country. 
The battle for the historical record is being fought in the federal 
courts, where the desire for efficiency all too often unwittingly rein-
forces postwar trafficking in Nazi-looted art.  For example, in Detroit 
Institute of Art v. Ullin, a federal court in Michigan efficiently ruled that 
the statute of limitations on one claim ran in 1938—before the Allies 
even landed on the beaches of Normandy, much less liberated survi-
vors from camps.45  Moreover, the case was a declaratory judgment ac-
tion filed by The Detroit Institute of Arts against the heirs of Martha 
Nathan, who had not yet resorted to judicial process.46  The heirs had 
approached the museum about their newly discovered evidence that 
Ms. Nathan’s sale of The Diggers by Vincent van Gogh had been made 
under duress.47  The museum responded by filing suit, contending 
that the sale of the painting, which was located in Switzerland in 
1938—after Ms. Nathan had fled Germany for Paris—was voluntary 
because it occurred prior to the Nazi occupation of France.48
The Ullin court never considered the fact—not commonly known 
by those who are not Holocaust scholars—that the Nazis often forced 
fleeing Jews to transfer property located in Switzerland back to the 
Reich, often as a means to secure safe passage of other family mem-
bers held hostage.
 
49
 
43
See Milton Esterow, Europe Is Still Hunting Its Plundered Art, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
1964, at 1 (noting the recovery of nearly 4000 pieces of art by the State Department 
between 1945 and 1962). 
  The number of Jews subjected to persecution 
44
See supra notes 9 & 15, and accompanying text.  
45
See Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *3 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 31, 2007) (finding that conversion occurred in 1938 when the painting at 
issue was sold and that the statute of limitations barred any claims brought more than 
three years later, in accordance with Michigan law). 
46
Id. at *1.  
47
Id.  
48
Id. 
49
See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 138 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (identifying an ordin-
ance requiring Jews to register assets with an aim to appropriate those assets held 
extraterritorially). 
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from afar could be small because the wealth at stake had to merit the 
Nazis’ time and effort to steal in less convenient ways.  Nonetheless, it 
happened, and our courts should not be utilized to quash evidence 
that it did.  A consequence of the suit is that the painting remains on 
display as if Ms. Nathan had been perfectly free to engage in fair 
commercial transactions while on the run from a genocidal regime. 
In 2006, the Toledo Museum of Art also brought suit against the 
Nathan heirs to quiet title to Paul Gauguin’s Street Scene in Tahiti, 
which had been transferred as part of the same 1938 sale.50  The Unit-
ed States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the 
statute of limitations, as modified by the discovery rule, had expired 
some undefined time in the past, thereby barring the heirs’ counter-
claims for conversion and restitution.51  The court held that the claim 
should have been discovered earlier because the painting had been 
openly displayed since its acquisition in 1939—contemporaneous with 
the approach of the Holocaust’s zenith—with public acknowledgment 
of Ms. Nathan’s prior ownership.52  As proof that Ms. Nathan knew she 
lacked a valid claim to the Gauguin, the court noted that she had pur-
sued other Aryanized and looted property prior to her death in 1958, 
but not this painting.53  Nor did the accounting trustee of her estate 
claim the painting.54
Most problematic for heirs of Holocaust victims and refugees is 
the Ohio court’s statement that 
 
the public debate surrounding Nazi-era assets should have led the Na-
than heirs to inquire into the location of her former assets.  Based upon 
Martha Nathan’s own previous claims, as well as those of her estate, the 
heirs knew she was persecuted by the Nazis and sustained wartime losses.  
This knowledge would have led a reasonable person to make further in-
quiries.
55
In other words, Holocaust victims’ heirs were negligent if they did not 
pay close attention to litigation concerning a painful, historical trage-
dy and realize it may have had particular relevance to them, even 
though they were not parties to that litigation. 
 
Recent case law applying discovery rule principles in stolen art 
cases effectively, incorrectly, and seemingly unintentionally dictates 
something akin to a de facto due diligence search rule coupled with 
 
50
 Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 803 (N.D. Ohio 2006).   
51
Id. at 806-08. 
52
Id.  
53
Id.  
54
Id. at 805, 807. 
55
Id. at 807. 
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an unfounded assumption that a present-day possessor suffers preju-
dice in her ability to defend the suit simply because of the amount of 
time that has passed.56
[T]he balance of equities weighs in [the claimants’] favor.  [The subse-
quent purchasers] purchased the Painting without inquiring as to the 
painting’s prior ownership or the identity of the consignor, or making 
any inquiry of art or law enforcement agencies, and with the knowledge 
that the Painting was in five pieces—suspicious circumstances to say the 
least.  They took the risk that an original owner could appear at any time.
  Why should the museums get the benefit of 
the doubt as to what hypothetical long-lost evidence may have shown?  
It is more likely that the evidence would have favored the claimant in 
the “typical” Holocaust-era-art case.  The relevant inquiry is supposed 
to be highly fact-sensitive and should turn on what would be reasona-
ble under the circumstances—all of the circumstances.  A 1995 stolen-
art case not relating to the Holocaust, wherein the theft victims were 
not art-world insiders, illustrates this point well: 
57
Why would a reasonable person who had been persecuted to the ends 
of the earth look interminably for a needle in a haystack?  In fact, 
many survivors after the war were quite leery of state authority fig-
ures.
 
58
Courts’ reliance on the fact that Holocaust victims died before 
they could justify (and afford) the expense of a search plays right into 
the hands of the persecutors and profiteers.  A haunting testimonial 
relaying a statement by Heinrich Himmler, attributed in multiple 
sources to Rabbi Israel Singer, leader of the World Jewish Congress, 
makes the point:  “Himmler said you have to kill all the Jews because if 
you don’t kill them, their grandchildren will ask for their property 
back . . . .”
  How could Ms. Nathan have known, particularly before 1958, 
to search here in the United States to discover her trafficked proper-
ty?  Why do we demand that she have foreseen the Information Age 
and have directed her heirs to perpetually search for property she 
probably never imagined would resurface and become recoverable? 
59
 
56
See generally John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art:  Of Paintings, 
Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1122, 1152 (1980) (identifying a 
multifactor approach that modern courts should employ in discovery-rule cases). 
 
57
Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 WL 91406, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995). 
58
See e.g., BOAZ KAHANA ET AL., HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS AND IMMIGRANTS 75 
(2005) (noting that feelings of victimization among survivors can cause mistrust of 
strangers, particularly those in positions of authority). 
59
MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE:  THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN 
AMERICA’S COURTS 295 (2003); see also John L. Allen Jr., Victims No More, NAT’L CATH-
OLIC REP., May 7, 1999, at 3, 7, available at http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/ 
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IV.  MUSEUMS’ TRAMPLING ON HISTORY TO  
CAPITALIZE ON FADING MEMORIES 
Since the 1990s, legal scholarship and media coverage of the Ho-
locaust-era-art problem has often implied that the problem was vir-
tually unknown to art world insiders, who were caught unawares in 
1998 and have consistently done “the right thing” upon being noti-
fied.60  This is simply false.  Nazi looting and the persecution of Jews 
was front-page news as early as 1933,61 and it stayed in the news as art 
filtered deeper into the market.62  The U.S. executive branch also is-
sued warnings to museums and dealers to be on the lookout for loot.63
In my previous work, I have illustrated that the impetus for 
present-day possessors of art to shut down inquiry into the merits—in 
an effort to secure their stakes—is understandable but wrong: 
  
Thus, art world insiders buying European art during or after the War 
without ownership records were actually operating in highly suspi-
cious circumstances.  Additionally, because museums usually received 
the art in question via donation means that they have enjoyed the 
benefit (and so has the general public) solely at the victims’ expense. 
In December 1938, a year and a half after emigrating to Paris, [Ms. Na-
than] sold Street Scene in Tahiti and The Diggers—for approximately $6,000 
and $9,360, respectively—to a group of three prominent Jewish art deal-
ers who had known her for many years.  In May 1939 [with persecution 
of Jews almost at its zenith], the Toledo Museum of Art bought Street 
Scene in Tahiti from Wildenstein & Company for $25,000.  In 1969, the 
Detroit Institute of Arts received The Diggers as a donation from collector 
Robert H. Tannahill, who bought it in 1941 for $34,000.  Street Scene in 
Tahiti is currently estimated to be worth between $10 and $15 million.  
 
archives2/1999b/050799/050799a.htm (detailing Bayer Corporation’s legal battle 
over liability for IG Farben, a predecessor company deeply involved in the operation of 
concentration camps). 
60
See, e.g., Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust:  Holocaust Victim 
Fine Arts Litigation and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
87, 99-100 (1999) (“Claims of this type present a real threat to museums, auction 
houses and private collectors who have spent significant amounts of money on good 
faith purchases of what is later discovered to be ‘dubious’ art.  As a result, it is no sur-
prise that museums have begun to scour their collections for art of questionable title.”). 
61
See, e.g., Otto D. Tolischus, Hitler Will Seize Property of Foes, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1933, 
at 1; German Fugitives Tell of Atrocities at Hands of Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1933, at 1. 
62
See, e.g., Janet Flanner, The Beautiful Spoils (pts. 1-3), NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1947, 
at 31, Mar. 1, 1947, at 33, Mar. 8, 1947, at 38; Francis Henry Taylor, Europe’s Looted Art:  
Can It Be Recovered?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1943 (Magazine), at 18. 
63
See, Letter from Department of State to Universities, Museums, Art Dealers, and 
Booksellers (Dec. 11, 1950) (on file with author); Letter from The American Commis-
sion For The Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas 
to Museums, Art and Antique Dealers and Auction Houses (1945) (on file with author).   
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The Diggers is estimated at $15 million.
64
One can surmise that museums' reluctance to allow objective evalua-
tion of claims on the merits arises from fear of losing such valuable as-
sets, in addition to the stain such restitution leaves on the reputations 
of the dealers and donors in the ownership chain.  Other art objects 
similarly passed through their hands, and increased scrutiny may open 
up other objects to claims. 
 
 Reputations and tremendous amounts of money were also on the 
line in litigation filed by MoMA and the Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Foundation  against Julius Schoeps, heir to Paul von Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy, a prominent German banker and art collector.65  This dis-
pute was a heated contest concerning the interpretation of a pur-
ported 1927 transfer of two Pablo Picasso paintings, Boy Leading a 
Horse (1906) and Le Moulin de la Galette (1900), from Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy to his wife, who was Aryan.66  The heirs contended that the 
purported transfer was backdated to make it appear that the property 
was in Aryan hands before the Nazis’ rise to power; in reality, the 
transfer was made after the Nazis were in control.67  This method of 
backdating contracts to attempt to insulate property from Nazi expro-
priation was used often enough that the German language has a spe-
cific term for it: Verfolgten-Testament.68  The painting passed through 
the hands of a very well-known Jewish art dealer, Justin Thannhaus-
er.69
Thannhauser trafficked in stolen and Nazi-looted art during his career as 
a dealer.  Both during and after World War II, Thannhauser partnered 
with art dealers such as Nazi Cesar Mange de Hauke and Albert Skira, 
both of whom the U.S. State Department and others identified as traf-
fickers in Nazi-looted art.
  Schoeps alleged: 
70
 
64
Kreder, supra note 
 
2, at 62-63.  
65
See Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
66
Id. at 464. 
67
Id.  
68
See Schoeps v. Andrew Lloyd Webber Art Found., No. 116768-06, 2007 WL 
4098215, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2007) (describing the practice as “a last will set 
up in order to protect property from the Nazis, in the hope that it would pass on to 
successor heirs if and when the regime would have come to an end”). 
69
Schoeps, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 463-64.  
70
Counterclaim ¶ 40, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 2d 543 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-11074), 2008 WL 1982812 (citing Maureen Goggin & Walter v. 
Robinson, Murky Histories Cloud Some Local Art, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1997, at A1). 
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The dispute is one of a number in which Mr. Thannhauser’s name 
appears in the provenance.71  For example, Mr. Thannhauser was one 
of the three prominent art dealers who bought and sold Ms. Nathan’s 
paintings described above.  After the war, he (and his archives) 
helped many Jews recover art that had been expropriated from his 
gallery.  His family is thus certainly sensitive to these accusations and 
would deny them.  Still, seemingly no litigation filed to date has even 
attempted to resolve whether Mr. Thannhauser was a friend or foe of 
fleeing Jews, a fact that is extremely important in determining wheth-
er many paintings that he bought and sold during and after the war, 
which have made their way into other museums and collections, 
should be restituted.  The MoMA-Guggenheim-Schoeps litigation certain-
ly will not help in this regard as it settled on the eve of litigation, and 
that settlement remains confidential despite the prodding of the court 
to make it public (to which the museums ultimately agreed).72
I will make one final point here about the Schoeps litigation.  The 
MoMA/Guggenheim Complaint asserts: 
 
The facts and circumstances establish that both von Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy and his wife were free to decide whether or not to sell their 
artwork, were free to move artwork in and out of Germany without dis-
crimination, were not under financial pressure to sell as the Paintings 
represented a negligible percentage of their net worth, and neither the 
German State nor the Nazi party played any role in directing, urging or 
otherwise threatening any adverse consequences if the Paintings were 
not sold to Thannhauser. . . . The allegation that the Nazi government 
would force von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and his wife to sell the Paint-
ings to the Jewish art dealer Thannhauser, whom they knew and with 
whom they had done business for years, is completely implausible, as is 
the claim that they had to sell the Paintings because Nazi persecution 
had left them impoverished.
73
Esteemed institutions, informed by knowledgeable provenance re-
searchers who know better, should not use our courts to hide behind 
racial stereotyping and extremely biased portrayals of historical reality 
as a substitute to investigating true human behavior.   
 
 
71
See also United States v. One Oil Painting Entitled “Femme en Blanc” By Pablo 
Picasso, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that the painting was be-
ing held by Thannhauser when it was looted by Nazis); Goggin & Robinson, supra note 
70, at B12 (noting Thannhauser’s “associat[ion]” with Cesar Mange de Hauke). 
72
See Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 603 F. Supp. 2d 673, 674-75 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (observing that while the museums no longer objected to a public settlement, 
the plaintiffs insisted that it remain confidential). 
73
Complaint for Declaratory Relief ¶ 55, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 
F. Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-11074), 2007 WL 5161566. 
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In applying seemingly neutral legal doctrine in Holocaust-era-art 
cases, courts have failed to take into account the fact that prospects 
for restitution immediately after the War were grim.74  It is true that 
some tenacious families, including some with large art collections 
identified and located in Allied sectors, met with success, but most 
others had to move on to build new lives as refugees in new lands.  As 
the survivors’ heirs now approach those who currently possess their 
art, they are (understandably) met with defensiveness from current 
possessors because art patrons’ reputations are questioned and valua-
ble assets are on the line.  Few people seem to want to discover what 
actually happened as the Nazis rose to power and embarked on a mis-
sion of ever-increasing persecution of European Jews.  Those who did 
not leave early enough found themselves trapped—without means to 
make a living, blocked from accessing bank accounts or engaging in 
fair commercial transactions, and hemmed in by an exorbitant Flight 
Tax that prevented flight.75
Sometimes the judiciary provides a glimmer of hope, as did Judge 
Korman in his concurrence in Bakalar v. Vavra, a dispute over a draw-
ing from the collection of Fritz Grunbaum.
  This record is being developed—and dis-
torted—in litigation. 
76  Grunbaum was a famous 
Viennese cabaret performer who had a fine collection of Egon Schiele 
drawings when the Nazis occupied Vienna.77  His heirs asserted a 
claim when a collector tried to auction one of the drawings in New 
York.78  Ultimately, the lower court ruled against the plaintiff, apply-
ing Swiss law, but the Second Circuit vacated and remanded in Sep-
tember 2010.79
Grunbaum was arrested while attempting to flee from the Nazis.  After 
his arrest, he never again had physical possession of any of his artwork, 
including the Drawing.  The power of attorney [to his wife, Elisabeth], 
  Judge Korman wrote an informative separate con-
currence explaining his view of the factual evidence, including the 
following summary: 
 
74
See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 682-83 (2004) (describing 
allegations regarding the Austrian postwar practice of extorting donations of some 
property in exchange for export permits of other property). 
75
See DEAN, supra note 20, at 43-44. 
76
See 619 F.3d 136, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring) (writing sepa-
rately to argue that Grunbaum could have proven his art was stolen by a preponder-
ance of the evidence). 
77
Id. at 137.  
78
Id. at 139. 
79
See id. at 146-48 (vacating the district court’s decision in Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05-
3037, 2008 WL 4067335 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008)). 
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which he was forced to execute while in the Dachau concentration 
camp, divested him of his legal control over the Drawing.  Such an invo-
luntary divestiture of possession and legal control rendered any subse-
quent transfer void.
80
Right after Elisabeth completed the forced inventories to streamline 
Nazi expropriation, she died in the Minsk extermination camp.
 
81
The panel’s opinion also instructed the lower court on remand to 
address laches, a doctrine that operates to bar stale claims if the op-
posing party would suffer prejudice in litigation.
 
82
Another example is Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, in which the 
Second Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a similar claim as time-barred.
  Again, where exist-
ing evidence so strongly points to theft, why should the present-day 
possessor get the benefit of the doubt as to what additional evidence 
might have been unearthed earlier?  Under common law principles, 
the true owner always prevails over other possessors.  Nonetheless, de-
spite horrific persecution, theft, and murder, Grunbaum’s heirs are 
likely to lose because they will be declared at fault for waiting too 
long.  The court would thereby reinforce theft and postwar traffick-
ing.  The drawing will be sold and one of two things will happen:  ei-
ther its background will be ignored or forgotten because the heirs lost 
in court or the mystique will actually drive the price upward. 
83  
The decision rests on the interpretation of letters exchanged between 
MoMA and the Grosz heirs’ art historian.84  MoMA convinced the 
court to dismiss the claim on the grounds that one of MoMA Chair-
man Glenn Lowry’s letters should be construed to have refused the 
claim, despite his repeated statements that only a majority of the 
board of directors—and not he alone—had the authority to speak for 
MoMA.85  Moreover, MoMA refused to even disclose its own prove-
nance records in the case, despite the fact that its own website proc-
laims that its files are open to all serious researchers.86
 
80
Id. at 148 (Korman, J. concurring); see also id. at 137-39 (majority opinion). 
  Goliath again 
81
Id. at 139. 
82
Id. at 147. 
83
Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, No. 10-0257, 2010 WL 5113311, at *1 (2d Cir. 
Dec. 16, 2010). 
84
Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, No. 09-civ-3706, 2010 WL 88003, at *7-*14 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010). 
85
Brief for Am. Jewish Cong. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 12-15, Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 2010 WL 5113311 (2d Cir. June 
22, 2010) (No. 10-0257). 
86
See The Provenance Research Project, MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, http:// 
www.moma.org/collection/provenance/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (“Please note that 
the Museum’s archival records for all collection works are open, as they always have 
been, to serious researchers.”). 
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beats David on a technicality, trampling on executive policy and histo-
ry. 
I will provide one final example of a prestigious U.S. museum’s 
shutting down objective inquiry into the history of a painting.  Last 
year, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston won a declaratory judgment 
action seeking to put to rest an inquiry (perhaps a demand) from Dr. 
Claudia Seger-Thomschitz to Two Nudes (Lovers) (1913) by Oskar Ko-
koschka, which had previously belonged to her father, Dr. Oskar Rei-
chel.87  Dr. Reichel was a Jewish doctor who owned an art gallery and a 
significant collection that was transferred after the Third Reich an-
nexed Austria in the Anschluss on March 12, 1938.88  The museum al-
leged that Dr. Reichel voluntarily sold the painting and three others 
by Kokoschka to Otto Kallir,89 a Viennese art dealer who had moved to 
Paris by the time of the sale in February 1939 and is said to have had 
been the most powerful influence on modern art collectors in the 
United States.90  The museum alleged that Dr. Reichel and Mr. Kallir 
had known each other for many years and often had done business 
together—the implication being that the sale naturally was fair and 
unrelated to the liquidation of Dr. Reichel’s gallery and paintings in 
November 1938 and the liquidation of the family’s apartment house 
in 1941.91  In 1943, Reichel died in Vienna.92  Two of his sons fled in 
1938 and 1939, one of his sons was murdered in 1940 or 1941, and his 
wife was deported to Theresienstadt.93
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz only knew to investigate additional claims 
after receiving a letter on November 10, 2003, from the Vienna Com-
munity Council for Culture and Science notifying her that she was the 
rightful heir to Romako paintings that passed through Otto Kallir:  “It 
is certain that these paintings involved art objects from the property of 
Dr. Oskar Reichel and which, in connection with the power seizure by 
National Socialism, he had to sell due to his persecution as a Jew to 
 
 
87
See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, No. 08-10097, 2009 WL 
6506658, at *1 (D. Mass. June 12, 2009). 
88
Id. 
89
Complaint at ¶ 1, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 
6506658 (D. Mass. Jan. 22, 2009) (No. 08-10097) [hereinafter Seger-Thomschitz Complaint]. 
90
See Laurie A. Stein, The Path of Art from Switzerland To America from the Late 1930’s 
to the Early 1950’s:  A Report of Research Results (undated but commissioned for 2002 re-
port) (on file with author). 
91
Seger-Thomschitz Complaint, supra note 89, at ¶ ¶ 1, 19.   
92
Id. at ¶ 3.  
93
Id. at ¶ 19. 
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the galleries mentioned . . . .”94  The court ruled that the date of the 
letter’s receipt was the latest date that the limitations clock could have 
started to tick, which meant the victims had no chance to recover giv-
en the date when the action was finally filed in court.95
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz argued unsuccessfully that the court should 
set aside the limitations period on equitable grounds because to hold 
otherwise would amount to “aiding, abetting, encouraging and facili-
tating the illegal and criminal intentional trafficking in stolen art,” 
particularly because the Austrian records containing Dr. Reichel’s 
Property Declaration were first made public in 1993 after the family 
had stopped searching for assets.
 
96  The Property Declaration listed 
Romako and Kokoschka paintings and included evidence that “pay-
ment” for the Romako painting in the Vienna Community Council’s 
possession had been made into a blocked account.97  She maintained 
that the stranglehold of the Property Declaration upon the paintings 
and evidence of payment into a blocked account for the Romakos in-
dicated that the same thing likely happened in connection with the 
Kokoschkas, which Kallir had sold to another dealer by 1945.98
Sarah Blodgett bought Two Nudes in 1947 or 1948 and donated it 
to the museum in 1972, where it has remained on public display.
 
99  
Thus, whereas the Viennese government returned paintings because 
“[i]t is certain” their path from Dr. Reichel though Mr. Kallir oc-
curred “due to . . . persecution,”100
CONCLUSION 
 a U.S. federal court in Boston ef-
fectively elevated the public’s enjoyment of the paintings over the 
need to unwind transactions that financed genocide. 
This Essay is an academic’s attempt to shed light on a dark mo-
ment—the duping of our courts by some prominent U.S. museums to 
accept revisionist history, contravene executive policies dating to 1943, 
and unwittingly endorse a pillar of the Nazis’ persecution and geno-
cide of Jews.  Application of limitations periods, the discovery rule, 
 
94
First Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Exhibit 1, at 2, Museum of Fine Arts, 
Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 6506658 (D. Mass. July 24, 2008) (No. 08-10097) 
[hereinafter Austrian Council Letter]. 
95
Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 6506658, at *9. 
96
Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 6506658, at *6. 
97
First Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Answer at ¶ 51, Museum of Fine Arts, 
Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 6506658 (D. Mass. July 24, 2008) (No. 08-10097). 
98
Id.  
99
Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 6506658, at *2.  
100
Austrian Council Letter, supra note 94, at 2. 
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and related procedural bars under these circumstances is misguided 
both as a matter of law and as a matter of ethics.  As survivors and sol-
diers die, as archives are opened to historians, and as information 
trickles out, survivors’ heirs are learning that their families owned 
some of the most beautiful treasures mankind knows, which were sto-
len or forcibly sold and are now housed in our most esteemed mu-
seums.  Those who benefited may have the exclusive keys to those 
snippets—and often still do.  Thus, the reason for delay often lies on 
their shoulders.  Ancient maxims of common law dictate that the sto-
len property should be returned, even sixty or seventy years later. 
Courts should pay careful attention to history before reaching 
judgment on which claims are plausible.  As recognized by some mu-
seums that have restituted Holocaust-era art without forcing heirs into 
court,101 most of the claimants’ “stories,” like those discussed in the 
cases above, are in fact plausible.  With precedents such as those dis-
cussed in this Essay, the judiciary is undermining the executive’s abili-
ty to continue to lead the world movement toward securing a mod-
icum of justice for Holocaust survivors affected by the “unfinished 
business” of World War II.102
Human memory is very short.  Apologists for defeated nations are some-
times able to play upon the sympathy and magnanimity of their victors, 
so that the true facts, never authoritatively recorded, become obscured 
and forgotten.
  Our judges should remember the words 
of Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom at 
Nuremberg, who warned: 
103
  
 
 
101
See Carol Vogel, Inside Art, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011, at C25 (detailing the ef-
forts of the Zimmerli Art Museum at Rutgers University to restore artwork to the 
grandson of a Holocaust survivor); see also Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisi-
tion of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDO-
ZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 438 n.121 (2003) (listing twelve museums that have re-
solved claims of this nature through settlement). 
102
See generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 42.  See also Washington Conference Prin-
ciples, supra note 42. 
103
3 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 91 (1947).   
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